The relationship between the effects of food aid and those of the completion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT are studied in this paper, focussing upon the food aid recipient countries, taking Bangladesh as an illustrative example. The magnitudes of these effects depend crucially on the policy environment within the food aid recipient country itself, particularly the government's policy with respect to commercial food imports, as well as the way food aid donors respond to the Round. When the quantity of Bangladesh's commercial food imports is controlled by the government, the benefits derived from food aid are smaller, and the negative effects of the Uruguay Round will be larger, than when these imports are liberalised.
Introduction
The conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT has been welcomed in most quarters but concerns have also been expressed about the potential losers. It has been suggested that the final agreement may have negative implications for some countries which can least afford them -the least-developed, net food importing countries. The partial liberalisation of agricultural markets which was achieved in the Round will lead to increases in the international prices of some key agricultural commodities, especially grains, implying increases in the cost of food imports. Recognition of this fact has in turn led to the argument that the least-developed, food importing countries should be compensated for the adverse effects of the Round (Goldin et al., 1993: 25; Hamilton and Whalley, 1995) 1 . This paper analyses the relationship between these issues and food aid. We explore these relationships quantitatively in the context of Bangladesh, the world's largest recipient of food aid 2 and one of the world's poorest countries. Within the context of this study, 'food aid' will mean food grains donated to Bangladesh by other countries and will therefore not include food or other commodities preferentially priced for Bangladesh. Most of the least-developed, food importing countries are recipients of food aid from the OECD economies, especially from the food-exporting, industrialised nations who are themselves beneficiaries from the international agricultural price consequences expected from the Uruguay Round. On the one hand, food aid therefore seems a natural vehicle for the compensation of those leastdeveloped, food deficit countries -like Bangladesh -who apparently lose from the Round. It is not surprising that increases in food aid have been recommended in some international forums as a means of compensating the losers from the Uruguay Round.
1 See also UNCTAD (1990) , Francois et al (1994) , GATT (1994) , Nguyen et al (1993 and 1995) and Schott and Buurman (1994) . 2 Based on an average of total food aid shipments from 1990 to 1993, inclusive. Source: FAO, Food Aid in Figures, 1992 and On the other hand, such compensatory adjustments remain hypothetical. The most likely response of food aid donors seems to be the reverse of these recommendations -a reduction in food aid commitments. Implementation of the Uruguay Round agreement will mean that production-based subsidies will fall, and the surpluses in food-subsidising industrialised countries that previously contributed to food aid supplies will also fall. Some food aid donors have also reportedly experienced political pressures to reduce their quantitative commitments to food aid, in response to the Uruguay Round, including countries not presently subsidising grains production. The reason is that at present volumes of food aid the increases in the international prices of agricultural commodities will have adverse budgetary implications for their aid agencies. These agencies must purchase the food they deliver as aid and increases in grain prices mean increased budgetary costs of food aid. Unless the overall aid appropriation also rises, which seems unlikely, the share of the total aid package represented by food aid will increase, presumably requiring cuts in other forms of aid -unless the quantity of food aid committed is reduced. 3 The Uruguay Round final agreement specifically rules out reductions in food aid in response to the Round. 4 Nevertheless, reductions of precisely this kind seem the most likely outcome.
The analysis uses a general equilibrium approach, based upon a modified version of a 19-sector computable general equilibrium model of the Bangladesh economy, documented in Ahammad (1995) . Our quantitative analysis will ask, first, how the economic benefits derived from food aid are affected by the policy environment within the recipient country, especially as regards policy towards commercial food imports. Second, we ask how much the negative implications the Round will have for the least-developed food deficit countries would be magnified if donors were to reduce their food aid commitments in response to their increased budgetary costs. Third, we shall ask what increases in food aid would be required if food aid 3 Australia's food aid program provides an example of this process. Increased world grain prices in 1996 forced reductions in planned quantities of future food aid commitments, due to their budgetary implications. 4 See the Ministerial Declarations on Food Security found in the annex to the Uruguay Round text. Thia material is accessible on the World Wide Web at: http://ananse.irv.uit.no/trade_law/gatt/nav/toc.htm1.
were used as a compensatory instrument to offset the negative effects the Uruguay Round would otherwise have on apparent losers. Finally, we also study the relationship between the size of the required compensation, in the form of food aid, and the degree of liberalisation undertaken by the food aid recipient country itself.
Background: The Bangladesh economy
As shown in Table 1 , Bangladesh is characterised by low per capita income and slow growth, and a large, negative resource-balance to GDP ratio. The structure of GDP began to change only in recent years and agriculture remains a large share of national output and employment. Since the early 1980s, the contribution of services to GDP has exceeded that of agriculture, while industry's contribution has remained static at around 16 per cent. Table 1 Since the mid-1980s, the structure of export trade has changed significantly. Table 2 shows that the export shares of the traditional agro-based exports, jute, jute goods and tea, have declined while garments exports, which were insignificant in 1973, have become the major gross foreign exchange earner. In 1993, more than half of gross export dollars were earned by garments alone. Exports of leather and leather products, shrimp and fish are also substantial. While the shift from traditional exports to non-traditional exports is evident, heavy reliance on one or two broad commodities still continues: garments dominating in the 1980s and 1990s and jute goods dominating in the period up to and including the 1970s. Table 2 About 60 per cent of total garments exports go to the USA under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA). This arrangement, which controls world trade in textiles and garments, formally expired in December 1992 and was due for renegotiation. The conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT provides that the MFA is to be phased out over a 10 year period. Increased competition following the withdrawal of export quotas under the MFA would lead to lower world prices of garments. At least in the short run, it will have adverse implications for the balance of trade, employment and welfare of a country where 50 per cent of merchandise exports earnings are from garments. 5
Food imports: political sensitivity and budgetary implications
An important change in the structure of Bangladesh's import trade over the past two decades has been the increased share of capital goods relative to that of food and major primary goods. Nevertheless, Table 3 indicates that food -predominantly rice and wheatconstitutes a considerable proportion of the total import bill with a combined share which ranged between 19 and 4 per cent over the decade to 1993. Meeting the growing consumption requirements for cereals, particularly rice, remains an important political issue and a central objective of public policy. Table 3 About 80 per cent of the total cultivated area of Bangladesh is devoted to intensive rice and wheat production, but this commitment of resources does not produce sufficient food to meet demand. 6 Imports account for an average of 10 per cent of domestic food grains absorption. As Table 4 indicates, the bulk of these imports occur through food aid, although commercial imports are also significant. 7 Aside from a partial liberalisation in early 1994, most commercial imports of food have been controlled by the government to meet target levels of availability and to maintain low and stable food prices. Rising world prices thus put 5 The growth of Bangladesh's garment exports since the early 1980s was partly a result of reallocations from quota constrained exporting countries such as Sri Lanka and South Korea, towards the then unconstrained exporting country, Bangladesh. The success of the garments industry is also partly attributable to preferential export incentives provided by the Bangladesh government. Together with the fact that for some categories quotas have not been not binding, it appears that the Bangladesh garments industry may not be competitive internationally. Hence, a fall in the world prices of garments following the dismantling of the MFA (leading to a transfer of rents from exporting to importing countries) will affect Bangladesh negatively. 6 The cropping intensity in 1990-91 was 171 per cent (Bangladesh 1992) . 7 In 1988-89, the base period for the simulation model to be used below, the proportion of food aid in total food imports was 63 per cent. pressure on the balance of payments and on the government's budget. The possibility of comprehensive food import liberalisation remains controversial within Bangladesh because it would leave domestic food grain markets vulnerable to international price fluctuations -not unlike those projected to occur as a result of the Uruguay Round. Table 4 Import substitution
The Bangladesh government has pursued a protectionist, import-substitution industrialisation strategy. For some selected manufacturing industries it established import controls to insulate domestic markets from international competition. These included outright bans and discretionary quantitative restrictions through Import Policy Orders, import licenses, and tariffs. Until 1984, import licenses were used to ration foreign currency at the official exchange rate to importers. The extent of the commodity coverage of the import licensing system has subsequently declined.
The tariff structure designed for protecting some selected domestic industries is also used to raise government revenue. Even in the late 1980s, more than 30 per cent of total government revenue came directly from tariffs (Bangladesh 1993) . The result was high and discretionary rates of protection which, instead of merely guiding investment decisions, have tended to be an instrument of ensuring the ex post profitability of selected industrial investments. Import controls and limited export incentives have meant that adjustments to the official exchange rate have played a minor role as an instrument of trade policy (Ahammad 1995:17) . The taka (the Bangladesh currency) has been over-valued in the sense that, because of tariffs and exchange controls, the official exchange rate (taka per US$) has been lower than it would have been, at an unchanged money supply, if these barriers to trade had been eliminated.
Agricultural and agro-based exports -mainly jute, jute products and tea -have been seriously disadvantaged by Bangladesh's trade policies. The overall policy bias lies in protecting industry at the expense of agriculture, directly through tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs), and indirectly through the overvalued exchange rate. An anti-export bias was also evident -with the possible exception of garments, which has access to duty free imports, some export incentives and a secured overseas market. Estimates of effective rates of protection by Hutcheson (1986) , summarised in Table 5 , indicate that the average effective rate of protection for import-substituting activities was 135 per cent compared with 11 per cent for export industries. The overall level of effective protection to manufacturing was 114 per cent as against 13 per cent to agriculture, and for rice and wheat it was around 4 per cent.
The policy bias against food production has contributed to the continued dependency on food imports, predominantly consisting of food aid. Food security continues to be a serious concern for the government, but the problem has been partly self-induced. Table 5 In the 1980s several attempts were made to reform the tariff structure by reducing the variance of tariffs. In 1986, the number of statutory rates was reduced from 24 to 11. In 1988 the government adopted a phased three-year program intended eventually to reduce maximum tariffs: (i) for most final good imports, from over 200 per cent to 100 per cent; (ii) for raw materials, to 20 per cent; and (iii) for intermediate products, to 75 per cent.
Despite these trade policy reforms, Bangladesh remains highly protectionist. Bhuyan and Rashid (1993) estimated the effective rates of protection for selected industries using survey data for 1990 and the Balassa et al. (1971) method of treating non-traded inputs. The estimates showed that industries received degrees of nominal and effective protection which varied widely. Wet-blue cow leather had a 4,483 per cent effective rate of protection for domestic sale, while hand loom industry produce had effective protection as low as 20 per cent. Negative effective protection, due to value added at border prices exceeding value added at domestic prices, was also found for several industries. 8 8 Negative rates of effective protection can also occur for another, quite different, reasonnegative value added at border prices. Negative rates arising from this source indicate industries receiving very high rates of protection because without their protection they would become non-viable. At least one examples of this kind can be found for Bangladesh -a rate of -693 per cent for cotton fabric. It is obviously important to distinguish negative effective rates arising from negative value added at border prices from the more usual source of (positive) value added at border prices exceeding value added at domestic prices because their implications are entirely opposite. Import-substitution activities continued to enjoy very high protection (Bhuyan and Rashid 1993) . Stern et al. (1988) estimated the real effective trade-weighted exchange rates for imports and exports, incorporating the effects of taxes, subsidies, relative inflation rates, and changes in the relative values of trading partner currencies. From 1974 to 1985, the real effective exchange rate for imports consistently exceeded the real effective exchange rate for total exports. The real effective exchange rates for non-traditional exports (mainly garments) always exceeded those for total exports, reflecting the policy bias towards the non-traditional activities and discrimination against the traditional agricultural exports.
Implications of the Uruguay Round
Bangladesh has been among the developing countries which have protested the possible negative implications of the Uruguay Round for their international trading position. These concerns would seem, in general terms, to be well founded. In Table 6 we summarise the results of ten previous studies which have projected the changes in world commodity prices which may result from the conclusion of the Uruguay Round.
It must be stressed that the price changes summarised in Table 6 represent the projected effects of the Uruguay Round, ceteris paribus. They project the differences between the prices that will emerge after the completion of the Round compared with what those prices would otherwise have been if the Round had not been successfully completed but all other relevant circumstances had been the same. That is, these projections should not be confused with predictions of the price changes that will actually occur in the period following the Round. These actual price changes will be products of many changes in market conditions other than the completion of the Uruguay Round and the projections shown in Table 6 do not allow for factors other that the completion of the Round itself.
The price changes indicated in Table 6 refer to a time frame of six to ten years after the conclusion of the Round, during which the policy adjustments agreed upon in the Round are to be implemented. Table 6 refers to price changes after this period of adjustment, but are to be considered permanent thereafter. Since the early 1990s, perceptions of the achievements of the Uruguay Round have abated significantly. In general, the more recent the study, the more modest are the changes in international price projected to result from the Round. Table 6 In the final two columns of Table 6 we show Bangladesh's import and export shares for each of the commodities shown. These trade shares are used as the basis for calculating the projected changes in Bangladesh's terms of trade in the last row of the table. Although the ten studies shown differ considerably in the modelling basis for their price projections, all imply a deterioration in Bangladesh's terms of trade. 9 Of these, the set of results reported by Duncan et al (1994) have been used as the basis for our simulations based on the Uruguay Round, to be presented in Table 8 , below.
The simulation model
The global economic models used to study the impact of the successful conclusion of the Round, as summarised in Table 6 , vary somewhat in their behavioural assumptions, but more significantly in their geographical (ie. regional) dimensions and levels of commodity aggregation. In all such global models of which the authors are aware, the Bangladesh economy is aggregated together with many other economies with diverse production and trade compositions, producing aggregates such as the entire 'South Asia' region or 'low income Asia'. The need to simplify such global models is obvious, but important information can be lost through aggregation. The effects that the Uruguay Round has on the Bangladesh economy could well be significantly different from those found for the region or country group within which Bangladesh is included.
This study uses a 19-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Bangladesh economy, based on the model documented in Ahammad (1995) , which featured a dual foreign exchange market. In view of the recent dismantling of the legal secondary exchange market, the earlier model is modified for the purpose of the present study to incorporate a single unified exchange rate. The Bangladesh model belongs to the Johansen class of CGE models. The structural equations are specified in percentage change form.
Each sector produces a single composite commodity using intermediate inputs and two primary factors -labour and capital. The two primary factors are Cobb-Douglas substitutes for one another in the production of a composite primary factor input. Production functions for industry output then use each of the intermediate inputs and the composite primary input in fixed proportions (Leontief).
Sectors maximise their total revenue by producing for domestic and overseas markets.
Outputs sold domestically are imperfect substitutes for exported output. Symmetrically, goods produced domestically are treated as imperfect substitutes in domestic demand for imported goods within the same statistical category. Only one representative household is considered, which maximises utility given its income from profits, wages and net transfers from the government. Consumer demands for commodities are based on a linear expenditure system (LES). The government also intervenes in domestic markets through indirect taxes, including trade taxes. Any surplus or deficit in the government budget is financed by lumpsum subsidies to or taxes on the household.
The version of the Bangladesh model used in this paper includes data base and structural amendments intended to improve its capacity to handle issues involving food aid. Imports of foodgrains -rice and wheat -are divided into food aid and commercial import categories.
Commercial imports enter the balance of payments as a debit item but food aid imports do not. The latter are assumed to be sold domestically by the Bangladesh government and the proceeds of these sales enter general government revenue. It will be evident that the economic mechanism by which the level of commercial imports is determined will have important consequences for the simulated effects of food aid.
The data-base and simulation experiments
The model contains base period structural coefficients including cost, revenue and sales shares. The share coefficients are calculated from the same input-output table for 1989 used by Mansur and Khondker (1991) , supplemented by data from other official documents. 10 The model also contains behavioural elasticities, which include: elasticities of substitution in demand between domestically produced and imported commodities (Armington elasticities) 11 ; elasticities of transformation in production between goods destined for the domestic market and exports; substitution elasticities between primary factors; household expenditure elasticities; and world export demand elasticities. 12 The elasticity parameters were based on an extensive literature search. The complete sets of input-output data files and the elasticity and miscellaneous parameter files are documented in Ahammad (1995) . 13 
Model closure
The simulations are designed to evaluate the impact of changes in food aid, on the one hand, and the successful completion of the Uruguay Round on the other. We examine their effects on the structure of the economy and on economic welfare within Bangladesh in a oneperiod framework. Household welfare depends on its real consumption of goods and services. The changes in the Bangladesh economy, brought about by the exogenous changes in food aid or in world prices following the multilateral trade liberalisation under the Round, are constrained to channel into household consumption within Bangladesh. To do this, investment expenditures of all kinds, government current consumption, and the balance of trade are held at their base-year levels. This is done because changes in these variables would lead to real-world benefits but would not lead to any measured benefits to the household in a one-period modelling context, as measured by changes in its real consumption. The 10 Appendix Table A.1 summarises the characteristics of the industries appearing in the model. 11 The Armington elasticities were derived from Adelman and Robinson (1978) and Habito (1984) . 12 See Ahammad (1995) for further discussion of the sources of all parameters used. 13 In assembling the present version of the model some minor adjustments were made to the cif import values and fob export values for some relevant commodities from those shown in Ahammad (1995) . The reasons are that the present version of the model incorporates a single unified exchange rate, eliminating the implicit tariffs or export subsidies previously present under the multiple exchange rate system, and also that total food (rice and wheat) imports are decomposed into aid and commercial import components, requiring that each component be treated appropriately for balance of payments purposes. government budget is balanced in the sense that any increase (decrease) in the government's net budget surplus is transferred to (from) households in lump sum form. A fixed current account deficit should be understood to mean that any short-run change in the current account balance will be eliminated by policy adjustments exogenous to the model.
As explained above, the economy is a price taker for its imports, and faces constant elasticity downward-sloping foreign demand curves for its exports. However, unless otherwise stated, the government is assumed to possess monopoly power with respect to all food imports. This is captured in the model used here by exogenising commercial food imports and thus endogenising the difference between cif import prices for food and the domestic prices for these imports. For all commodities except jute and jute goods, export demand elasticities are finite but very large. The world prices for these commodities are 'almost' exogenous. But Bangladesh enjoys some market power for world trade in jute and jute products, as discussed above. Any rise (or fall) in Bangladesh exports of jute and jute products would, therefore, reduce (or raise) their world prices. As a result of the supply responses of Bangladesh exporters, price rises (or falls) of jute and jute goods would be somewhat less than those actually predicted by those studies under consideration. The low elasticities for jute and jute products are based on the empirical studies (Imam 1970 , Nguyen and Bhuyan 1977 , Thomas 1979 .
The model treats capital as industry-specific. A slack employment market under constant real wages is assumed so as to capture the reality of involuntary unemployment in Bangladesh. Any government budget deficit (or surplus) on account of food subsidies is financed by lump-sum taxes on (or subsidies to) the household, thereby affecting household welfare. There is an unlimited number of possible alternative ways for the government to finance the food budget which will, ultimately, also affect household welfare. But in assuming lump-sum taxes or subsidies we are abstracting, for simplicity, from the possible distortionary impacts associated with alternative methods of financing.
13
The closure described above is the base case. For some simulations, this closure is amended, particularly with respect to the treatment of commercial food imports. The presentation of our results will be in three parts. First, we simulate the effects that changes in the level of food aid delivered to Bangladesh have on the Bangladesh economy, in isolation from the effects of the Uruguay Round. Next, we take the results of past studies on the implications that the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT may have for international commodity prices, as summarised in Table 6 above and apply them as exogenous shocks to the Bangladesh model. Then, finally, we explore the relationship between food aid and the effects of the Uruguay Round, focussing on the way the domestic policy environment within Bangladesh affects this relationship. Table 7 fall into two sets. Set 1, indicated by the suffix 1 (A1, B1, and so forth), reflects the assumption that commercial food imports (all food imports other than food aid) are subject to fixed government controls. Set 2, indicated by the suffix 2 (A2, B2,...), assumes that commercial food imports are liberalised. Table 7 shows the effect of an increase in food aid merely for convenience. The linearity of the underlying model implies that the effects of a 10 per cent reduction in food aid are the same as those shown, but with all signs reversed. In simulation A1 rice food aid is increased by 10 per cent, in B1 wheat food aid is increased by 10 per cent and in C1 both forms of food aid are each increased by 10 per cent. Linearity also implies that the results of simulation C1 are simply the sum of those obtained from A1 and B1.
Simulation results 14

Effects of food aid
Within set 2, simulations A2 through C2 are identical to A1 to C1, respectively, except that they are carried out on the assumption that commercial food imports are market determined. The quantity of such imports is determined by domestic demand for imports at the going price and the domestic price of these imports is determined by the cif price of imports and the exchange rate. In Bangladesh, neither rice nor wheat imports are subject to tariffs and our treatment reflects this reality. 15 It follows that in simulation set 2, but not in 14 For the reader's convenience, Appendix Table A.2 summarises the economic meaning of the various simulation experiments reported in Tables 7 and 8 . 15 The bound rates of duty submitted to the GATT in Bangladesh's country schedule were 50 per cent. Source: Bangladesh submission to GATT, 1994. simulation set 1, the quantities of commercial imports of rice and wheat may adjust in response to exogenous changes in food aid or to other external shocks. 16 Table 7 In modelling terms, the difference between the simulation experiments in sets 1 and 2 is that in set 1, the quantities of commercial imports of rice and wheat are each exogenously fixed and the domestic prices of these imports are endogenously determined. In set 2, the quantities of these imports are each endogenous and the domestic producer and consumer prices of each of these two kinds of imports are determined by the cif prices of these imports and the exchange rate.
An increase in food aid in the form of rice, in the presence of exogenously fixed commercial imports of rice and wheat (column A1 of Table 7 ), leads to a reduction in the domestic producer price of rice and hence to reduced rice production. Rice producers' incomes also fall in real terms. 17 The changes in relative prices lead to an increase in nonrice agricultural production. Consumption of rice as well as aggregate consumption increases. As rice constitutes a major share of agricultural value added, aggregate agricultural output falls. Manufacturing output and services expand, resulting in an overall increase in GDP at market prices. The demand for labour expands and aggregate employment rises at the exogenously fixed real wage. The rise in aggregate consumption is an indicator of a welfare improvement.
A 10 per cent increase in food aid in the form of wheat (column B1 of Table 7 ) is also welfare augmenting. The larger welfare gain from a 10 per cent increase in wheat aid is due primarily to the fact that the share of wheat in the total value of food aid at cif prices in the base year is considerably larger than that of rice. Effects on the domestic wheat market are also larger than was the case with rice food aid and the domestic rice market because wheat food aid represents a much larger share of the domestic market than is the case with rice.
When commercial imports are liberalised, as in simulation set 2, an increase in food aid in the form of either rice or wheat induces a reduction in commercial imports, but is still welfare improving. Since the social benefit derived from a unit increase in food aid in this situation is its cif value, the form in which food aid is given -rice or wheat -is unimportant. This fact is reflected in the proportionality relationship between the effects of an increase in rice aid (column A2) and the corresponding effects of that in wheat aid (column B2). 18 The constant of proportionality reflects the relative cif values of a unit proportional increase in each of these two forms of food aid. When commercial food imports are liberalised it is solely the cif value of the aid, in whichever form it takes, that determines the magnitude of its economic effects.
The effects on the domestic markets for wheat and rice are quite different in these two sets of cases. Three important points to notice are first, that in simulation set 2, commercial imports decline substantially when food aid is increased. This is unsurprising but it is the key to understanding the difference between the results of simulation sets 1 and 2. When commercial food imports are liberalised, the increased consumption that an increase in food aid makes possible is taken partly in the form of imports of commodities other than food.
Second, as a result of this fact, the increase in food consumption which results from a 10 per cent increase in food aid is smaller in simulation set 2 than in set 1. Third, the simulated increase in overall welfare (aggregate real consumption) resulting from food aid is significantly larger in simulation set 2 than in set 1. 18 The economic basis for this result is that in simulation set 2, where imports of rice and wheat imports are liberalised, imported rice and wheat correspond to pure traded goods. Their social values (shadow prices) are proportional to their cif prices (Warr 1977) . In simulation set 1, the quantitative restrictions on imports of rice and wheat mean that these commodities are not strictly traded goods and their social values (shadow prices) are not necessarily proportional to their cif prices (Warr 1982) When commercial food imports are liberalised, it is possible to substitute freely between food aid and commercial imports. In welfare terms, it is efficient to consume the benefits of increased food aid partly in the form of increased imports of commodities other than food.
When the level of commercial food imports is market-determined (set 2), this is exactly what happens. A decline in commercial imports of food is the means by which part of the value of the increased food aid is consumed in the form of non-food imports. But when the quantity of commercial food imports are fixed (set 1), these adjustments are impeded; a contraction in food imports, freeing foreign exchange for increased purchases of non-food imports, cannot occur. The value of the food aid, in terms of the increase in consumer welfare that it produces, is correspondingly smaller. The resulting increase in food consumption is smaller when food imports are liberalised, but the welfare gain is larger -more than double. Clearly, the economic effects of food aid depend heavily on the government's policy stance with respect to commercial food imports. Table 8 summarises the results of a set of simulations designed the draw out the relationships between the effects of the Uruguay Round and the policy responses of both the food aid donor and recipient countries. Columns D1 and D2 simulate the effects of the postUruguay Round changes in international prices summarised in Table 6 (based on the cif and fob columns marked S1), under the two different domestic policy environments regarding commercial food imports discussed above in relation to Table 7 . In simulation D1 the volumes of commercial food imports are exogenously fixed and in D2 these imports are liberalised. The volume of food aid is fixed exogenously at the base-year level in both D1 and D2. Table 8 It is not surprising that welfare (aggregate real consumption) falls in both scenarios depicted in simulation sets 1 and 2. In simulation D2, commercial food imports decline in response to the increase in their price. This adjustment reduces the welfare impact of the increases in international food prices induced by the Uruguay Round because Bangladesh is able to substitute away from the imports which have become more costly. But these adjustments are again impeded when the quantities of commercial food imports are controlled (D1) and the welfare loss induced by the Uruguay Round is thus substantially greater -by a factor of more than 2.5. As in Table 7 above, the domestic effects of external events (an increase in food aid, as in Table 7 , and the Uruguay Round induced international price changes as in Table 8 ) depend considerably on the domestic policy environment.
Implications of the Uruguay Round
Simulations E1 and E2 are intended to show the effects of a hypothetical policy response to the Uruguay Round on the part of food aid donors. As noted above, by increasing international food prices, the Uruguay Round increases the budgetary cost of food aid to donor agencies. Suppose they were to respond by reducing the volume of food aid so as to keep its US dollar value constant. What would that mean for food aid recipient countries like Bangladesh? Columns E1 and E2 show the projected effects of the Uruguay Round changes simulated in columns D1 and D2, but this time with donor agencies responding as just described.
It is not surprising that the welfare loss from the Uruguay Round is magnified when donors respond in this way. That is, the estimated welfare losses found in E1 and E2 are greater than those estimated in simulations D1 and D2. The welfare loss in E2 is around 80 percent larger than in D2, but the loss in simulation E1 is only 17 per cent larger than in D1.
The reason for the large difference is that when the quantity of commercial food imports can be adjusted in response to the Uruguay Round (D2), food aid has greater value at the margin than it does when commercial imports are fixed in quantity terms (D1). Thus, when donors reduce their food aid in response to the Uruguay Round, the welfare loss caused is greater when commercial food imports are liberalised (E2 compared with D2) than when these imports are controlled (E1 compared with D1). Nevertheless the total welfare loss that results from the Uruguay Round combined with this response from donors remains smaller when commercial food imports are liberalised (E2) than when they are not (E1).
Finally, simulations F1 and G1 examine the increases in food aid that would be required if food aid were to be used as an instrument for compensating the least-developed food importing countries like Bangladesh for the welfare loss that the Uruguay Round would otherwise cause. The policy scenario depicted by these simulations is hypothetical. As noted above, reductions in food aid seem the more likely policy response for virtually all food aid donors. Nevertheless, compensatory increases in food aid have indeed been recommended and it is therefore of interest to analyse what such a prescription would actually entail. The increases in food aid shown should be interpreted as permanent increases that would be required by the end of the 6 to 10 year implementation period of the Uruguay Round agreement.
For brevity, we shall consider only the case where the quantities of commercial food imports are controlled, as in D1 and E1. From column F1, an increase in total food aid to Bangladesh of 40 per cent would be required to achieve this outcome. 19 But column G1 varies this simulation by assuming that, at the same time, Bangladesh reduces its own rates of tariff protection -across the board -on all commodity imports subject to positive tariffs -by 24 per cent. This is the average rate of liberalisation agreed to by developing countries at the Uruguay Round, except for the least developed countries like Bangladesh, which were exempted from any required liberalisation. In this case, simulation G1 shows that no increased food aid would be required to maintain welfare in Bangladesh; a small reduction in food aid would still be consistent with maintaining welfare. Another way of expressing this result is that the simulated aggregate benefits derived by Bangladesh from a 24 per cent liberalisation of its own rates of protection would more than offset the losses it incurs from the Uruguay Round.
Conclusions
This paper has focussed upon the food aid recipient countries, taking Bangladesh as an illustrative example, and has studied the relationship between the effects of food aid and those of the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT. We have argued that, among other factors, the magnitudes of these effects depend crucially on the policy environment within the food aid recipient country itself. We have drawn particular attention to the role of the government's policy towards commercial food imports, a controversial policy issue within Bangladesh. We have also analysed the way the effects of the Uruguay Round depend on the response of food aid donors to the international effects of the Round.
When the quantity of Bangladesh's commercial food imports is controlled by the government, the benefits derived from food aid are smaller than when these imports are liberalised. Likewise, the negative effects that the Uruguay Round may be expected to have on Bangladesh will also be larger if commercial food imports are subject to quantitative controls than if they are liberalised. Finally, we have shown that the effects the Uruguay Round will have on Bangladesh will depend significantly on the way food aid donors respond to the Round. If donors reduce the volumes of food aid in response to increased international food prices resulting from the Round, the losses incurred by the least-developed, food deficit countries -such as Bangladesh -will be magnified. But these effects will also depend heavily on whether Bangladesh itself participates in the liberalisations that are central to the Round itself. If it were to participate fully, the negative effects that the Uruguay Round would otherwise have on Bangladesh may be entirely offset by the gains Bangladesh would derive from its own liberalisation. 
_______________________________________________________________________
Notes:
1 Industry consists of mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity, water and gas. 2 Defined as the value of exports of goods and non-factor services minus the value of imports of goods and non-factor services. 3 Based on CPI.
Sources:
Government of Bangladesh, 1994 . Bangladesh Economic Review 1993 
Government of Bangladesh, 1994 . Export from Bangladesh 1972 -73 to 1992 Promotion Bureau, Government of Bangladesh, Dhaka;
Government of Bangladesh, 1994 . Imports, mimeo, Planning Commission, Dhaka; Government of Bangladesh, 1994 . Bangladesh Economic Review 1993 Hutcheson 1986) . The rates based on the prevailing exchange rate were called `gross effective rates of protection'. If the entire protection structure were withdrawn, the exchange rate would have to rise sufficiently to maintain the same trade balance as before. The gross effective rates adjusted for such exchange rate effects, are thè net effective rates of protection' (Hutcheson 1986 ). b Indicates negative value-added at border prices.
Source:
Calculated from Hutcheson (1986) . All the ratios are calculated at the basic prices.
Source: Ahammad (1995) .
